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The relationship between political regimes and inequalities has been studied from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives. This paper reviews the existing 
literature on the subject in order to assess the effects of political regimes on 
inequalities as well as the effects of inequalities on political regimes. On the one 
hand, we expect democracy to have a positive relationship with equality; on the 
other hand, we expect inequalities to have a positive effect on the level of 
democracy. My reading of the theoretical literature suggests that the results are 
heterogeneous. I present the mechanisms through which one might expect 
redistributive effects on incomes in a democracy and accordingly demonstrate that 
democracy does not necessarily reduce inequalities if it is captured by either interest 
groups or the middle class. I further present how inequalities drive social unrest, 
which might force a society to become more democratic, and in what way good 
economics characteristics lead to a democratic society. Empirical analyses on the 
linkage also provide inconclusive results about the effects of political regimes on 
inequalities and the effects of inequalities on political regimes. All things 
considered, I found different results depending on the sample or methods used. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Louis Brandeis, member on the Supreme Court of the United States from 1916 
to 1939, said: “We can either have democracy in this country or we can have great 
wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.”. But is there a 
relationship between political regimes and economic performance? Researchers 
have long tried to seek this relationship; in particular, the link between political 
structure and economic growth (see e.g. Barro, 1994; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001 
or Acemoglu et al., 2019) or between political regimes and income distribution (see 
e.g. Putterman, 1996; Boix, 2003 or Acemoglu et al., 2014) have been examined. 
Many studies have advocated that democracy helps reduce inequalities of income 
by extending political power (Weede, 1982 or Muller, 1988). Far from a consensus 
on the relationship between democracy and inequality, it has also been suggested 
that inequalities could undermine democratic political regime (Dahl, 1977). On the 
other hand, it has also been argued that both factors have no bearing on each other 
(Jackman, 1975 or Bollen and Jackman, 1985).  
In line with these questions, this master thesis seeks to review the literature on 
the relationship between political regimes and inequality and the direction of the 
causality. First, the relevant theoretical literature is presented to determine the 
different arguments explaining how democracy might affect inequality and how 
inequality might impact democracy. Then, I review the empirical studies to assess 
if it is consistent with the theory.  
One expects a political system to impact income redistribution through laws, 
institutions, and policies in effect in that system (Acemoglu, 2008). For instance, it 
is anticipated that nondemocratic regimes, where political power is concentrated 
within a limited segment of the population, will experience greater inequalities 
(Acemoglu et al., 2014, p.1886). A typical nondemocratic regime is an authoritarian 
regime and according to Kaufman Purcell (1978), it has three main characteristics: 
limited diversity in the political body, which implies political power to be in the 
hand of an elite or a group of elites; low subject mobilization of the population, 
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which means the authoritarian leader has significant decision-making autonomy; 
and the low political participation (Kaufman Purcell, 1978, p.30). 
On the other hand, according to Lenski (1966), the idea that a democratic society 
is more equal is based on three characteristics these societies have: universal adult 
right to vote; the right of political opposition and the possibility for disadvantaged 
group to form and engage in collective action (Lenski, 1966, p.318). Indeed, in a 
democratic regime, mobilization is moderate and legal rulership predominates. 
Decision-makers have less autonomy and the political participation will be higher 
(Kaufman Purcell, 1973, p.37). However, a democratic society often has populist 
tendencies, with certain groups taking advantage of the circumstances that political 
power is more equally distributed to expropriate assets (Acemoglu, 2008, p.2). 
In this paper, I will look at the relationship between political regimes and 
inequality. I will especially focus on the direction of the causality to assess if the 
effects go in the direction of political regimes affecting inequality, or inequality 
affecting political regimes. Theoretically, I present the model of Meltzer and 
Richard (1981), whose argument is that democracy has a redistributive effect on 
income through the extension of the voting right toward poorer segments of society. 
Then, I identify why democratization might not lead to a reduction of inequality 
when democracy is captured by an elite or the middle-class to their advantage. I 
also present models of inequality influencing political regimes; first a mechanism 
highlighted by two papers of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2002) on how the 
threat of a revolution might lead to democratization and then in what way 
intrinsically good economics characteristics lead to a democratic society.  
Second, I review the empirical evidence on this topic. For both the effects of 
political regimes on inequality and the effects of inequality on political regimes, I 
aimed to find papers with different methods and samples. The majority of former 
studies only measure a correlation, while more recent ones take endogeneity and 
control for different variables into account.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the theoretical 
connections between political regimes and inequality. Section 2.1 presents the 
effects of political regime on inequality and section 2.2 the effects of inequality on 
political regime. Section 3 reviews the existing empirical literature: Section 3.1 
4 
 
presents an empirical survey of the impact of political regimes on inequalities and 
section 3.2 then reviews the empirical literature on the impact of inequalities on 
political regimes. Section 4 concludes.  
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2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL 
REGIMES AND INEQUALITIES: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
In this part, I will focus on the theoretical aspects. I will introduce models of the 
relationship between political regimes and inequalities. These associations will be 
divided into two sections; I will first present the effects of political regimes on 
inequalities, followed by the effects of inequalities on political regimes. 
 
2.1. MODELS EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF 
POLITICAL REGIMES ON INEQUALITIES 
 
Impacts of political regimes on inequalities might happen through different 
mechanisms, some of which will be described in this thesis. I will start with the 
redistributive effects of democracy presented by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and 
remodeled by other authors. Next, I will present how democracy may be captured 
by interest groups and, therefore, does not reduce inequalities. Finally, I will 
demonstrate how redistribution works under autocratic regimes.  
 
2.1.1. THE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY 
The first mechanism introduced is the one of Meltzer and Richard (1981). They 
use the median voter theorem to assess how a democracy may diminish inequalities. 
This theorem, which is a simple way to model the functioning of a democratic 
society, assumes that the median voter always gets their most preferred policy 
(Congleton, 2002, pp.2-3). Under the assumption that the median voter’s position 
is more leftist in democracies than in non-democracies, we can expect democracies 
to have lower level of inequalities than there is in non-democracies. Indeed, if a tax 
is determined by the initial distribution of income and the median voter’s position, 
6 
 
the revenue of this tax is distributed proportionately in the population. Since the 
median voter is shifted toward poorer segments of society, through the extension of 
the voting franchise, inequalities may be expected to decrease through 
redistribution (Timmons, 2010, pp.4-5). In order to give a more pedagogical 
understanding of this theory, I will also present a simplified version of the model 
which has been further developed in the paper of Acemoglu et al. (2014). 
 
The main assumption Meltzer and Richard (1981) make in their model is that 
democracy has a redistributive effect on incomes. They argue that a change in the 
voting rules could possibly change the income tax rate. When political power is 
extended toward poorer segments of society, the median voter will be shifted in this 
part of the population. Therefore, votes for redistribution increase, and 
consequently, inequalities are reduced.  
 
The basic framework 
In the example of a society with a large number of agents, prices, wages, and tax 
rates are taken as given and differences in productivity are reflected by differences 
in endowment. Agents only differ in their endowment of income 𝑦 (with its mean 
being ?̅?), which consist of productivity 𝑥 and the time they allocate to labor 𝑛. 𝐹(𝑦) 
is the distribution function of income in the society, or the fraction of the population 
whose income is less than 𝑦. 
The government only has one policy instrument, which is a tax 𝜏 imposed on all 
individuals. The tax is proportional to earned income since productivity cannot be 
directly observed. As emphasized before, the revenue of the tax is then used to 
finance lump-sum redistribution of 𝑟 units of consumption per capita. 
 
Maximization problem of the agent 
The rational agent wants to maximize their utility; the maximization problem 
under the constraint presented in (2.2) is the following: 
 
max
𝑛∈[0,1]
𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) = max
𝑛∈[0,1]
𝑢[𝑟 + 𝑛𝑥(1 − 𝜏), 1 − 𝑛], (2.1) 
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with 𝑐 for consumption, 𝑙 for leisure, 𝑟 the revenue of the tax, 𝑛 the number of 
worked hours, 𝑥 the productivity and 𝜏 the tax. Agents are price taker in the labor 
market, take 𝜏 and 𝑟 as given and select 𝑛 to maximize their utility. 
 
Determination of the optimal tax rate 
In a society using universal suffrage with majority rule, the voter with the median 
income is decisive. Such individual has to find a tax rate that maximizes their own 
utility. However, the lump-sum transfer 𝑇 is determined by the government budget 
constraint, and the tax should also balance the government budget. The government 
only spends money on redistribution of income, which suggests: 
 
𝑇 ≤ 𝜏?̅? − 𝐶(𝜏)?̅?, (2.2) 
 
with 𝑇  representing the government budget constraint and the transfer to all 
agents, 𝜏  the tax rate, ?̅?  the mean individual income and 𝐶(𝜏)  capturing the 
distortionary costs of taxation. 
The tax rate 𝜏 is to be found so that it maximizes the median voter’s utility 
(equation 2.1) given the government budget (equation 2.2). Therefore, under those 
circumstances: 
 
0 = ?̅? + 𝜏
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
− ?̂?, (2.3) 
 
The preferred post-tax income of each individual, which is found by solving the 
first-order condition, is the following:  
 
?̂? = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦 + 𝜏?̅? − 𝐶(𝜏)?̅?. (2.4) 
 
This equation implies that the higher the income, the lower the preferred tax rate. 
Indeed, the tax is imposed on the income and then used to redistribute to all agents, 
so that individual with higher income do not want to be taxed more and also do not 
need more transfer.  
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Extension of the voting franchise 
Nonetheless, if it is assumed that only agents with a higher income than 𝑦𝑞, the 
𝑞𝑡ℎ  percentile of the income distribution have the right to vote, the remaining 
agents, therefore, will be disenfranchised. That said, in the case of a further 
transition to democracy with an extension of the franchise, 𝑦𝑞′ becomes lower than 
𝑦𝑞. Thus, the tax rate 𝜏𝑞′ is then higher than 𝜏𝑞 and the resulting post-tax income 
distribution 𝐹𝑞′  is more equal since it is more focused around its mean than 𝐹𝑞 
(Acemoglu et al., 2015, pp.1890-1892). 
 
The main result 
All things considered, the outcome of the model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
is that democratization increases the number of voters with relatively low income. 
The position of the decisive voter depreciates the distribution of income, and 
therefore, while increasing the demand for a higher taxation, results in a more 
significant redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). 
  
2.1.2. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF 
INTEREST GROUPS 
A democratization does not necessarily lead to reduction in inequality. This 
argument is discussed in this subsection along with the role of the interest groups. 
I will first focus on how the democracy might be captured by an elite and will then 
present the way middle-class population can take advantage of the democracy. 
 
2.1.2.1. THE CASE WHERE DEMOCRACY IS CAPTURED BY 
THE ELITES 
The first possible mechanism is presented by Acemoglu et al. (2011). They 
establish a model of inefficient states in which the rich elite influences the public 
bureaucracy. They show that when a society begins as nondemocratic but is, 
however, likely to democratize, the rich population will feel threatened. Thus, in 
order to limit redistribution, they will find it profitable to choose an inefficient 
organization which will enable them to capture democratic politics. Moreover, 
bureaucrats will most likely vote for the rich because they receive rents and expect 
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bureaucratic reform if the poor were to come to power. Therefore, a coalition 
emerges between the rich elite and bureaucrats. In addition to this, not only do 
inefficient states expand, but they also persist. Indeed, bureaucrats vote for the elite, 
which does not reform the bureaucracy. This leads to an elite that captures 
democracy by establishing an inefficient state structure, which will not only induce 
less redistribution, but also limited public good provision (Acemoglu et al., 2011) 
 
Albertus and Menaldo (2013) also argue that democracy can often be captured 
by elites and may therefore not be able to redistribute to a greater extent than 
autocracies. If a democratization happens when elites are considered as weak, the 
relationship between democracy and redistribution will emerge (Albertus and 
Menaldo, 2013, pp.576-577). However, during transition, a powerful elite will 
manage to create institutions that copy their strength. As a result, an elite-biased 
democracy in which the economic elite succeeds in exploiting their power in an 
effective way, will equally manage to manipulate political outcomes. They can do 
so through powerful lobbying or vote buying (Albertus and Menaldo, 2013, p.581). 
Thus, an elite-biased constitution, even if it is a democracy, might reduce 
redistribution. As a matter of fact, the probability of right-wing executives is higher 
because of the over-representation of elite interests related to these constitutions. 
Moreover, the elite will support institutions and electoral rules that facilitate 
powerful interests to defend their control in local politics (Albertus and Menaldo, 
2013, p.584). 
 
Further, Acemoglu et al. (2014) argue that the rich elite might take action to 
increase their de facto power, and consequently, nullify de jure power that poorer 
agents acquired through democratization. This will be the case under the 
assumption that the redistribution of income is made between the rich elite 
(enfranchised) and the rest of the population, the latter being the majority, which is 
not enfranchised at the beginning. Acemoglu et al. (2014) further suppose that the 
rich elite has the possibility to strengthen their de facto power and therefore control 
the political system to some extent, under costly investments. When there is a 
limited franchise, the elite does not need to bear the cost to capture the democracy. 
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However, when the voting franchise is extended, the larger and poorer segment of 
the society will impose higher redistribution. Thus, if the cost is not excessively 
high, the rich elite might find it profitable to set the tax at a stage that is profitable 
for them. Subsequently, no changes in taxes and redistribution of income will ensue 
as a result of democratization (Acemoglu et al., 2014, p.1895).  
It is, however, noteworthy to mention that democracy can possibly lead to an 
increase in taxes while not having any relevant effect on inequality. The elite, along 
with their de facto power, could shift redistribution toward themselves but does not 
have such power to control taxes. In line with this supposition, democratization 
would affect inequality only to a small extent, but with a significant impact on 
taxation (Acemoglu et al., 2014, pp.1896-1897). 
 
2.1.2.2. THE CASE WHERE DEMOCRACY IS CAPTURED BY 
THE MIDDLE CLASS 
Democracy might not be captured by the elite, but by the middle-class which 
will be empowered by a democratization. This idea is suggested by Stigler (1970), 
who presents a law of public expenditures proposed by Aaron Director. The 
Director’s Law argues that “Public expenditures are made for the primary benefit 
of the middle class and financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by 
the poor and the rich” (Stigler, 1970, p.1). Therefore, agents of the middle-class 
will use this power to redistribute income to themselves, which will limit the impact 
of democracy on inequalities. 
To defend the plausibility of Director’s Law, Stigler (1970) cites examples of 
how the middle-class manages to capture the democracy and hence, uses the state 
in their favor. For instance, the middle-class benefits from the social security 
system. Indeed, the latter taxes massively individuals who work early, who die 
early, who were young when first covered by the law and families in which the wife 
is working. All these effects tend to favor the middle-class. Furthermore, the authors 
found out that tax exemptions were mainly given to institutions which serve the 
middle-class, such as educational and medical institutions (Stigler, 1970). 
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2014) also discuss this idea. They demonstrate that the 
increasing power of the elite may limit redistribution and therefore the outcome for 
inequalities (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2014, p.1901). They suppose that the society 
is divided between the rich elite, the middle-class and the poor. They also assume 
that after a democratization, the median voter will be an individual from the middle-
class. This will be the case if there are more agents in the middle-class than in the 
rich one and if the extension of the franchise is limited; or if the median voter is 
situated in the middle-class and there is development to a full democracy. Unlike 
the conclusion of the model of redistributive democracy in which the middle-class 
is empowered, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the result of the income 
redistribution is ambiguous and depends on several factors. For instance, if the poor 
class is large and not excessively poor in comparison to the rich class, inequalities 
will increase because the burden of taxation is borne by the poor. It also depends 
on the fortune of the middle-class: if they are significantly poorer than the rich, a 
more equal society will arise; if they are much richer than the poor, the outcome 
will be a less equal society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2014, pp.1898-1900). 
 
2.1.3. REDISTRIBUTION IN AN AUTOCRACY 
This subsection focuses on the orientation of the policies chosen by an autocratic 
government. I will start by presenting the suggestion of Beitz (1982) who claims 
that redistribution does occur in an autocracy. Then, I will present the idea of Bollen 
and Jackman (1985) based on the belief that if the state-elites orient their policy 
toward economic growth, inequalities will rise. Finally, I will present the model of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) who suggest that redistribution only arises in the 
case of a revolution threat.  
 
Beitz (1982) suggests that redistribution does occur in an autocracy. This idea is 
emphasized in the paper by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990). Beitz’s argument is that 
authoritarian regimes are more competent at protecting the interests of the poor and 
the working-class than democracies. Indeed, Beitz (1982) admits that democracies 
are more receptive to demands of societal members, although they do not respect 
their members equally as sources of claims. This prevents the disadvantaged agents 
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from taking advantage of the political rights. Moreover, inequalities in 
redistribution of resources are repeated in inequalities of political influence. Thus, 
authoritarian regimes excel in protecting interests of the disadvantaged who are 
unable to defend theirs in a democratic society (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990, p.135).  
 
Besides, Bollen and Jackman (1985) argue that in autocratic regimes, since there 
is no political mechanism that holds the elite responsible for the disadvantages 
agents in the society, they can pursue policies that benefit the minority as long as 
they want. For instance, if representatives of the land-owning class are included in 
the regime, it is likely for the latter to disrupt land reform, which intends to reduce 
inequality. Similarly, monarchies have a low level of political representativeness, 
which implies greater inequalities. This suggests that in nondemocratic regimes, 
because the elites are not accountable to the majority, inequalities are more likely 
to arise (Bollen and Jackman, 1985, p.439). 
 
Lee (2005) suggests that public sector extension is more likely to result in higher 
inequalities in an autocratic regime (or a limited democracy). He argues that the 
output depends on the policy: as mentioned before, the motive of the state elite is 
oriented on economic development, which will counterbalance the redistributive 
propensity within the use of state resources. Hence, a state-elite focused on growth 
will not improve global equality in the society. As a matter of fact, their policy will 
aim to create and develop new industrial forces with the help of infrastructures and 
low taxes. Thus, state-held resources will be used for this matter and not to improve 
redistribution and equality (Lee, 2005, pp.160-161). 
 
Lastly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that in an autocracy, redistribution 
takes place only when a democracy imposes a revolutionary threat. The authors 
found out that many Western societies extended voting rights and thus increased 
redistribution in order to prevent a democratization.  
Let us summarize their argument: suppose that each agent is able to invest to 
increase their capital and there is a tax rate set by the elite. As long as there is no 
menace of a revolution in the autocratic society, inequality increases because the 
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poor cannot accumulate unless they receive transfers. Meanwhile, the rich do 
accumulate capital and therefore grow their income. When a menace arises, there 
are different output possibilities and it depends on when this threat arises.  
If it arises at some point 𝑡 for the first time and the transfer from the rich to the 
poor is enough for the poor to start accumulating, then inequalities decrease. When 
the menace of a revolution is too conspicuous, the elite is forced to extend the 
franchise. This results in a democracy where the median voter is poor and votes for 
a redistributive tax, which he will get from the rich and whereby he will be able to 
accumulate. Consequently, inequalities decrease. Democratization then happens to 
be the only solution when the threat appears any time after 𝑡  (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2000, pp.1178-1180). 
On the other hand, the elite can prevent a revolution that arises before 𝑡 with 
momentary measures when inequalities are not too important. In this case, the 
authors demonstrate that when transfers stop because the menace of a revolution is 
no longer here, inequality grows again. Indeed, this happens since, as already 
mentioned, the poor are not able to accumulate without transfer, as the transitory 
redistribution is not enough. If another threat appears later on, then democratization 
may be the only solution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, p.1180). 
The last possibility is a menace or revolution occurring at a time before 𝑡 but 
with a transfer high enough to permit the poor to accumulate. The outcome is a 
nondemocratic development path, and inequalities thenceforth remain constant, as 
not only do the poor accumulate, but the rich too (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 
p.1181). 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory (2000) demonstrates that in an autocracy, the 
franchise is extended because of a menace of revolution as a consequence of 
inequalities. This is a first indication that the relationship between political regimes 
and inequalities might go in the other direction1. However, the model reveals that 
it is only when the franchise is extended that inequalities drop. Inequalities do 
decrease if the elite chooses to initiate temporary measures, but they rise again as 
soon as the transfer stops, which delays the democratization. In the only case in 
 
1 This will be the subject of the next section. 
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which democratization is avoided, inequalities do not decrease but stay constant 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000).  
 
2.2. MODELS EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF 
INEQUALITIES ON POLITICAL REGIMES  
 
As already mentioned, it is also possible that inequalities influence the political 
regime of a society. We already briefly suggested how in an autocracy – where 
inequalities are supposed to be higher than in a democracy, more redistribution 
occurs when the poor pose a revolution threat. In this subsection, I will first present 
how the threat of revolution may lead to democratization, specifically because of 
inequalities. Indeed, inequalities drive social unrest which might force a society to 
democratize.  
The second subsection presents how inequalities, among others, affect the 
endogenous evolution of democratic constitutions. 
 
2.2.1. THE CASE WHERE THERE IS A THREAT OF A 
REVOLUTION 
I first present the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), which emphasizes 
the role of social unrest, specifically the threat of a revolution, as a factor in the 
transition to democracy. They argue that when the poor are excluded from political 
power, they set a revolutionary threat which is likely to lead to a transition to 
democracy. 
Then, I present another model of the same authors. It is related to the first model, 
but on their second paper, the focus is on industrialization. Indeed, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2002) show how industrialization concentrates poor individuals in urban 
centers, resulting in an increased political unrest and threat of revolution.  
 
a. The paper by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)  
In their first model, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) analyze the question of the 
conditions that determine political institutions. They emphasize the fact that the rich 
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will most likely be against a democracy while the poor will be pro-democratic. This 
emanates from the fact that the poor have the opportunity to impose higher taxes on 
the rich in a democratic society. In nondemocratic societies, the poor are excluded 
from political power, but they set a revolutionary threat because they want more 
redistribution. The rich elite tries to avoid a revolution by redistributing income to 
the poor, because a revolution is costly. However, if redistribution is not a 
commitment credible enough to future income distribution, the elite will be forced 
to extend the franchise and will therefore change the society into a democracy 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, p.939).  
 
The basic framework 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) consider a society with a share 𝜆 of poor agents 
and the remaining 1 − 𝜆 are rich agents (the elite). If the regime is democratic, the 
tax rate is set by the median voter, who is a poor individual. In a nondemocracy, the 
rich elite sets the tax rate, but the poor can attempt a revolution.  
There is only one consumption good 𝑦  and a unique asset ℎ , which is a 
combination of human capital, physical capital and land. Initially, at time 𝑡 = 0, 
poor agents have capital ℎ0
𝑝
 and agents of the elite have ℎ𝑟 > ℎ𝑝 . 𝐴𝑡  represents 
aggregate productivity of the economy and it can take the value 𝐴ℎ = 1  with 
probability 1 − 𝑠 or 𝐴𝑙 = 𝑎 with probability 𝑠. It is assumed that 𝐴𝑙 = 𝑎 < 1 is a 
period of recession, and that they are rare so that 𝑠 < 1 2⁄ . Thus, 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴
ℎ  is a 
“normal” time. 
To set up inequalities, assume that the elite have capital ℎ𝑟 = (1 − )ℎ/(1 − 𝜆) 
and the poor have ℎ𝑝 = ℎ/𝜆, where 𝜆 > > 0, meaning that a low level of  
corresponds to higher inequalities. If one assumes that the society is a non-
democracy at first, poor agents cannot take part in the political process. However, 
they can attempt a revolution at any time 𝑡 ≥ 1 , which is believed to always 
succeed. The poor expropriate a fraction 𝜋 −  of the asset of the economy, and a 
share 1 − 𝜇 > 0 of the income is destroyed during the process of a revolution. 
Assume further that as a result of a revolution, the rich lose everything, meaning 
they will always want to prevent it. Thus, if the value of 𝜇 is low, a revolution will 
be costly and if the value of 𝜋 is low, the gains from a revolution will be small. 
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However, the elite has no special power in a democracy, but they can attempt a 
coup. The coup is assumed to always succeed, and after the coup the elite are again 
in control of political power. A share 1 − 𝜙 of all agent’s income is destroyed in 
the process (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, pp.940-942). 
 
The Set of Strategies of the agents 
In each period of the game, different events happen: 
1. The state 𝐴𝑡 ∈ {𝐴
ℎ, 𝐴𝑙} is known, so it is clear if we are in a period of 
recession or a “normal” time. 
2. If a revolution has occurred in any preceding period, the poor get their 
share of the income, there is consumption and the period ends.  
3. The group in power sets the tax rate 𝜏𝑡. If the society is a democracy, the 
poor choose the tax rate; in a non-democracy the rich choose the rate. 
4. The rich decide whether to extend the franchise (in a non-democracy) or 
whether to mount a coup (in a democracy). If the franchise is extended 
or if a coup takes place, the party coming to power will either choose to 
keep the tax 𝜏𝑡 of stage 3 or to set a new rate. 
5. In a non-democracy, the poor choose whether to start a revolution or not. 
If a revolution occurs, they share the surviving output of the economy. 
Otherwise, the tax rate decided from stage 3 or 4 remains.  
6. Consumption takes place and the period ends.  
 
The economy is characterized by a multi-stage game between the elite, treated 
as one player and the poor, also considered as one player2. As solution concept, the 
authors use Markov perfect equilibrium, in which strategies only depend on the 
current state of the world and the previous actions taken in the same period. This 
state 𝑆 can be one of (𝐴, 𝐷), (𝐴, 𝐸), or (𝐴, 𝑅). 𝐸 stands for a nondemocratic regime 
where the elite is in power, 𝐷 is for a democracy and 𝑅 for revolution. The strategy 
of the elite is designated by 𝜎𝑟(𝑆|𝜏
𝑝
). It depends on the State 𝑆 and the tax rate 
chosen by the poor, 𝜏𝑝 when 𝑆 = (𝐴, 𝐷). The actions of the elite are determined by 
this strategy, and they are denoted by {𝛾, , 𝜏𝑟} . The first term,  𝛾  denotes the 
 
2 To simplify, all poor agents are taken as identical, and all members of the elite are also identical. 
17 
 
extension of the franchise. Only in the state (𝐴, 𝐸) can the elite extend the voting 
franchise, 𝛾 = 1 means the franchise is extended and 𝛾 = 0 means no extension of 
the franchise. The second term,  is the decision to attempt a coup, which can only 
arise in the state (𝐴, 𝐷). = 1 is the decision to attempt a coup and = 0 means 
no coup. The last term 𝜏𝑟 is the tax rate set by the elite. They can choose this tax 
rate when 𝑆 = (𝐴, 𝐸) and 𝛾 = 0 or when 𝑆 = (𝐴, 𝐷) and = 1. 
The strategy that the poor use is 𝜎𝑝(𝑆|𝛾, 𝜏
𝑟
), it is a function of the state 𝑆 and 
the franchise extension and tax rate decision of the elite when 𝑆 = (𝐴, 𝐸). Their 
action is determined by their strategy which is the following: {𝜌, 𝜏𝑝}. The decision 
to undertake a revolution is denoted with 𝜌 , 𝜌 = 1  being equivalent to the 
revolution and 𝜌 = 1 no revolution. The second term, 𝜏𝑝 is the tax rate set by the 
poor, when 𝑆 = (𝐴, 𝐷). Thus, starting from (𝐴, 𝐸), if there is a revolution, the state 
becomes (𝐴, 𝑅). Without a revolution, if 𝛾 = 0, the state remains (𝐴, 𝐸) and if 𝛾 =
1, it becomes a democracy (𝐴, 𝐷). Starting from (𝐴, 𝐷) and if there is a coup, the 
state switches to (𝐴, 𝐸). Agents maximize their total future welfare, conditional on 
the strategy and actions by both players. A pure strategy Markov perfect 
equilibrium is a strategy pair {?̂?𝑟( 𝑆 ∣ 𝜏𝑝 ), ?̂?𝑝( 𝑆 ∣ 𝜏𝑟 )}  so that for all possible 
states 𝑆, ?̂?𝑝 and ?̂?𝑟 are the best responses given the other group’s strategy. In other 
words, in the first period, each group has to choose a strategy that will determine 
their action. To do so, they need to find their optimal tax rate. In the subgame 
equilibrium, each group maximizes their utility to find this optimal tax rate, given 
the anticipated strategy taken by the other groups in the next period. Lastly, this 
optimal tax rate will be used in their choice of strategy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2001, p.942). 
In the subgame, given the anticipated action of the rich, the optimal tax rate for 
a poor agent 𝜏𝑚  (when there is no threat of a coup) maximizes the individual’s 
consumption. This means: 
 
𝜏𝑚 = arg max
𝜏
(1 − 𝜏)𝐴𝑡ℎ
𝑝 + (𝜏 − 𝑐(𝜏))𝐴𝑡ℎ} , (2.5) 
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where (1 − 𝜏)𝐴𝑡ℎ
𝑝  is the after-tax earned income for the poor, and (𝜏 −
𝑐(𝜏))𝐴𝑡ℎ the lump-sum transfer 𝑇𝑡 that an agent of group 𝑖 receives from the state. 
The first-order condition of the problem is: 
 
𝑐′(𝜏𝑚) =
𝜆 −
𝜆
, (2.6) 
 
with 𝑐′(𝜏𝑚) being the cost of raising the optimal tax rate 𝜏𝑚 of a poor agent, 𝜆 
the share of poor agents and 𝜆 > > 0, so that 𝜏𝑚 decreases with an increase of . 
As in the voting model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) described above, the 
preferred tax rate of the poor increases along with inequalities. In the subgame, 
given the anticipated action of the rich, the median voter sets a zero tax rate (𝜏𝑚 =
0) when = 𝜆 so that ℎ𝑟 = ℎ𝑝. Let 𝛿𝑖( )𝐴𝑡 be the amount of redistribution that a 
person 𝑖  receives in state 𝐴𝑡  when the tax rate is 𝜏
𝑚  (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2001, p.943). 
 
Two assumptions are made to simplify the analysis. They will assure that when 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴
ℎ, neither a coup nor a revolution is beneficial. For a coup not to take place 
when 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴
ℎ, the following condition is sufficient:  
 
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝜙)ℎ𝑟 > −(1 + 𝛽𝑠(𝑎 − 1))𝛿𝑟( ), Assumption 1 
 
where 𝛽 is the discount factor, 1 − 𝜙 the share of the total income lost in the 
period of a coup, ℎ𝑟 the capital of the elite, 𝑠 the probability of a recession 𝑎 and 
𝛿𝑟( ) the net amount of redistribution received by a member of the elite. 
This assumption is given by comparing the cost of a coup during normal times 
for a rich agent ((1 − 𝜙)ℎ𝑟 + 𝛿𝑟( )) to the benefice of avoiding taxation in the 
future (with the net present value of taxation being −𝛽((1 − 𝑠) + 𝑠𝑎)𝛿𝑟( )/(1 −
𝛽)). These costs and benefits are impacted by the taxes in democracy, which are 
determined by inequalities.  
Starting in the state (𝐴𝑡, 𝐸), the poor undertaking a revolution would obtain: 
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𝑉𝑃(𝐴𝑡, 𝑅) =
𝜋𝜇𝐴𝑡ℎ
𝜆
+ 𝛽𝑊𝑃(𝑅), (2.7) 
 
with 
𝜋𝜇𝐴𝑡ℎ
𝜆
 being the period return of each agent and 𝑊𝑃(𝑅) =
(𝑠𝑎+1−𝑠)𝜋ℎ
(1−𝛽)𝜆
 the 
expected net present value of a poor after a revolution. Equation (2.7) follows 
because the poor receive only a share 𝜋𝜇 of the assets of the economy ℎ during a 
revolution and obtain 𝑊𝑃(𝑅) after. 
On the other hand, starting in the same state but without a revolution, they would 
obtain the following utility:  
 
?̂?
𝑃
(𝐴𝑡, 𝐸) = 𝐴𝑡ℎ
𝑝 + 𝛽
((1 − 𝑠) + 𝑠𝑎)ℎ𝑝
1 − 𝛽
, (2.8) 
 
with all variables defined as before. 
This situation appears so because without taxation, the poor receive ℎ𝑝 in period 
𝑡 and 𝑎ℎ𝑝 in all future recession periods. Equation (2.8) is the lower bound on the 
utility of poor individuals. Hence, ?̂?𝑃(𝐴ℎ, 𝐸) > 𝑉𝑃(𝐴ℎ, 𝑅) is a sufficient condition 
for the poor not to undertake a revolution in the state (𝐴ℎ, 𝐸); it is guaranteed by: 
  
𝜇 <
(𝜋 − )𝛽𝑠(1 − 𝑎) + − 𝛽𝜋
(1 − 𝛽)𝜋
. Assumption 2 
 
This will imply that the elite will choose no redistribution when in power, when 
the state is 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴
ℎ. 
The median voter in a democracy is a poor agent, thus the tax rate is 𝜏𝑚 because, 
by assumption, there is no attempt of a coup in normal times. Agents get ℎ𝑖 from 
his capital and 𝛿𝑖( ) from the government.  
I will not develop the possibility of the elite mounting a coup in this paper, but 
we can note that intuitively, more inequalities in a society means more 
redistribution, although this is less significant for the elite who will be more tempted 
to mount a coup.  
What is more interesting is the motivation of the poor to attempt a revolution in 
a non-democracy. As previously assumed, a revolution that is not binding at 𝐴𝑡 =
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𝐴ℎ might be binding at 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴
𝑙. Hence, the elite can choose redistribution in order 
to prevent revolution. However, the elite does not commit to future redistribution 
unless a revolution threat also exists in the future. The revolution constraint for the 
poor is the following:  
 
𝑊𝑝(𝑅) − 𝑊𝑝(𝐸) ≤
𝑎(ℎ𝑝 + 𝑝( , 𝜏𝑒) − 𝜇𝜋ℎ)
𝛽
, (2.9) 
 
with 𝑊𝑝(𝑅) − 𝑊𝑝(𝐸) being the difference between the utility for the poor after 
a revolution and their utility for living in a nondemocracy, 𝑎(ℎ𝑝 + 𝑝( , 𝜏𝑒) the 
total income received by the poor (the income from their earnings (1 − 𝜏𝑒)𝑎ℎ𝑝 plus 
the transfer 𝑇𝑡
𝑒 = (𝜏𝑒 − 𝑐(𝜏𝑒))𝑎ℎ) and the remaining variables defined above. 
The elite will set a tax rate 𝜏𝑒 as high as necessary to convince the poor not to 
attempt a revolution. However, there is a critical value of 𝜇 , designated by 
?̅?( , 𝑎, 𝑠), so that for every value of 𝜇 higher than that, no amount of redistribution 
can prevent a revolution to happen. The critical value is: 
 
?̅?( , 𝑎, 𝑠) =
(1 − 𝛽 + 𝑠𝛽)𝑎 (ℎ𝑝 + 𝛿𝑝( )) − (𝑎𝑠 + 1 − 𝑠)𝛽𝜋ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝑠)ℎ𝑝
(1 − 𝛽)𝑎𝜋ℎ
. (2.10) 
 
When 𝜇 < ?̅?( , 𝑎, 𝑠), the elite can prevent the poor from attempting a revolution, 
meaning the society will remain nondemocratic. Indeed, given the amount of 
inequalities and the value of 𝑠, a revolution is relatively costly, and redistribution 
can prevent revolution. 
Otherwise, for 𝜇 > ?̅?( , 𝑎, 𝑠) , a political change to democracy is the only 
solution for the elite. The following equilibrium (whether the democracy will be 
fully consolidated or not) will depend on the cost of a coup from the elite3. Higher 
inequalities are more likely to result in a revolution because 𝜕?̅?( , 𝑎, 𝑠)/𝜕𝑎 > 0, so 
that the poor are in a more advantageous position in a democracy (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2001, p.946). 
 
3 This will not be discussed in this paper. For further information, refer to Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001). 
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From this analysis, a conclusion can be drawn regarding the relationship between 
inequalities and political regimes. A reduction of  means the share of the income 
lost during the revolution ?̅?( , 𝑎, 𝑠) and thus the cost of a coup also decreases. A 
higher level of inequalities therefore leads to a higher probability of a revolution or 
a coup. In other words, the political regime is more likely to change with high level 
of inequalities (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). 
 
b. The paper by Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) 
In their second model, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) take industrialization 
into account in the rise of inequalities. Both this model and the previous one have 
a related pattern. In the previous model, they argue that in a non-democracy, the 
poor set a revolutionary threat since they are excluded from the political power and 
they want to contest this. In this model, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) confirm 
this theory, but they further argue through political economy theory of the Kuznets 
curve. They claim that the relationship between income per capita and inequality is 
driven by political changes. Consecutively, these political reforms are caused by 
the increase of social tension that comes from rising inequality. Most policies 
favored the elite and little redistribution was done to the masses before the 
nineteenth century in European countries. This leads to the mobilization of the poor 
and an increase of social unrest, eventually resulting in a forced radical reform by 
the elite (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002). 
 
The basic framework 
As seen in their previous model, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) consider a 
society with a share 𝜆 of poor individuals (denoted as 𝑝), and the remaining 1 − 𝜆 
is the rich elite (denoted as 𝑟). There is a unique consumption good 𝑦 and a unique 
asset ℎ, being a combination of human and physical capital. At time 𝑡 = 0, each 
poor agent has a capital ℎ0
𝑝
 and each member of the elite has ℎ0
𝑟 > ℎ0
𝑝 ≥ 1. To 
create the final good, two methods exist: a market technology 𝑌𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐴𝐻𝑡
𝑚 and an 
informal sector technology, 𝑌𝑡
ℎ = 𝐵𝐻𝑡
ℎ  where 𝐻𝑡
𝑚  resp. 𝐻𝑡
ℎ  are the amount of 
capital devoted to market technology resp. to the informal sector.  
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) assume that all agents have identical utility, 
characterized with their own consumption and educational bequests:  
 
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑡
𝑖, 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖 ) = {
(𝑐𝑡
𝑖)
1−𝛾
(𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖 )
𝛾
 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖 > 1
(𝑐𝑡
𝑖)
1−𝛾
 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖 ≤ 1
(2.11) 
 
with 𝑖 = 𝑟, 𝑝, 𝛾 ∈ (0,1), 𝑐𝑡
𝑖  the consumption of a member of group 𝑖 alive in 
period 𝑡 and 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖  the investment in the offspring’s education.  
The offspring’s human capital is given by:  
 
ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {1; 𝑍𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖 𝛽} , (2.12) 
 
with 𝑍 > 1 and 𝛽 < 1, so that accumulation is not infinite.  
Post-tax income is ?̂?𝑡
𝑖 ≡ (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝐴ℎ𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡  for 𝑖 = 𝑝, 𝑟  with 𝜏𝑡  the tax rate on 
income and 𝑇𝑡 ≥ 0 the transfer to agent from the state. At the beginning, the elite 
is in power and therefore has to decide in each period if they extend the voting 
franchise. If they do, the society develops into a democracy. Poor agents cannot 
take part in the political process and only after the decision of the elite can poor 
agents choose to attempt a revolution, which is assumed to always succeed. As seen 
in the previous section, revolution leads to redistribution from the rich to the poor, 
but it should be underlined that a share 1 − 𝜇 of the capital stock is lost in the 
process. If a revolution arises at a time 𝑡, each poor agent gets a per-period return 
of 𝜇𝐴𝐻𝑡/𝜆 in all future periods and the total income in the economy is 𝜇𝐴𝐻𝑡 shared 
between 𝜆 agents. If 𝜇 is small, a revolution is too costly and therefore not likely. 
As taxes are set after the decision of a revolution, poor agents will not engage 
themselves to redistribute from the elite credible. The only commitment is thus the 
extension of the franchise, which gives political power to the poor (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2002, pp.189-190). 
From the utility in equation (2.11), the authors make the assumption:  
 
𝛾𝐴 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝛾𝐵)𝛽𝑍 > 1. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 
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The first part suggests that with no taxation, an individual with the minimum 
level of human capital leaves no education to their offspring; the second part insures 
that when there is an accumulation of human capital, a steady-state level of human 
capital ℎ𝑠𝑠 > 1 can be attained. 
All the analyses start with the following initial condition: 
 
ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝑟 > ℎ0
𝑟 > (𝛾𝐴)−1, (2.13) 
 
with ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝑟  being the steady-state value of the rich’s human capital. ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝑟 > ℎ0
𝑟 
assures that we begin with less than steady-state human capital, so that there will 
be growth. It also assures that rich agents can leave positive endowment to their 
offspring. The poor are not able to do so, because their income in below the 
minimum necessary to leave anything to their offspring (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2002, pp.191-192). 
If a revolution becomes a real threat, the only credible promise is the extension 
of the franchise to the poor. The revolution constraint arises from comparing what 
poor individuals would get under the elite rule to what they would get after a 
revolution: 
 
ℎ𝑡
𝑟
ℎ𝑡
𝑝 ≤
𝜆(1 − 𝜇)
𝜇(1 − 𝜆)
. (2.14) 
 
If this equation can be considered as true, no revolution will arise at time 𝑡. A 
revolution is more likely to arise when inequalities are high, so when the gap 
between ℎ𝑡
𝑟 and ℎ𝑡
𝑝
 is large. The threat of a revolution also becomes more serious 
the lower 𝜆 is. Indeed, the goal of a revolution is to absorb the wealth of the rich; 
therefore, when there are fewer rich individuals, the outcome of the revolution is 
less interesting. (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002, pp.194-195). 
When only the rich accumulate, inequalities increase. If (2.14) is not binding at 
the point of steady-state (when inequalities are maximum), it will never be. Hence, 
we have the following condition: 
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ℎ𝑠𝑠 >
𝜆(1 − 𝜇)
𝜇(1 − 𝜆)
. Condition 1 
 
As the rich accumulate and if this condition holds, the threat of a revolution will 
eventually become persuasive and the elite will be forced to extend the franchise. 
Otherwise, the revolution constraint can be ignored, because it will never bind. 
Thus, the economy remains autocratic with high inequalities. This might be the case 
if there is no well-developed civil society, making it more challenging for the poor 
to organize and involving a small 𝜇 (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002, pp.195-196). 
When all agents accumulate, inequalities are decreasing and are also the highest 
at point 𝑡 = 0, the following condition appears: 
 
ℎ0
𝑟
ℎ0
𝑝 <
𝜆(1 − 𝜇)
𝜇(1 − 𝜆)
. Condition 2 
 
If Condition 2 is true, there will be no revolutionary threat at time 𝑡 = 0 and 
neither after, as inequalities will be reduced (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002, 
p.196). 
 
To sum up, both this model and the previous one reach a similar conclusion. A 
high level of inequalities makes the probability of a revolution more likely in the 
two models because the poor are excluded from the political power and they want 
to contest this. In this model, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) take into account 
development and industrialization as arguments of an increase in inequalities 
through social unrest; however, the crucial factors in the relationship between 
inequality and development are still political factors. The previous model only 
focuses on the social unrest-democratization relationship. Both models assumed 
that a revolution will always succeed, and if the poor do not have to confront issues 
such as an undeveloped society, the elite will be forced to democratize. Therefore, 
inequalities are positively correlated with a democratization in these two models.  
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2.2.2. THE CASE WHERE INTRINSICALLY GOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS LEAD TO A DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 
In this subsection, I will investigate the way a democratic society is affected by 
intrinsically good economic characteristics. The previous section argues that the 
elite initiates democratization because of the threat of conflict. This subsection 
presents the paper of Cervellati et al. (2005), which tries to provide a unified 
dynamic theory of both these arguments. They present a model of economic 
inequality and economic development both as a cause and a consequence of 
political changes (Cervellati et al., 2005, pp.1354-1356) 
 
Cervellati et al. (2005) emphasize the role of economic inequality and long-term 
development as a determinant of institutional and political changes. They focus 
particularly on the emergence of a social contract. They argue that both inequalities 
and development are the main determinants of the implemented regime. If the 
society is characterized by a low level of development and an elite is sufficiently 
richer than the poor agent, so that the engagement to a state of law is credible, then, 
the society is likely to become - and remain - an oligarchy. This equilibrium arises 
when neither the rich nor the poor have the incentive to deviate and get implicated 
in an open conflict. Unlike previous studies, here all groups prefer the oligarchic 
regime to a democratic one, as the latter would trigger a costly social conflict. On 
the other hand, if the income is more equally redistributed and the level of 
development is relatively high, a democracy is more likely to emerge. This is the 
case because democratization, under the pressure of the poor (as in Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2001; 2002), becomes less costly for the elite than avoiding 
redistribution. For the poor, avoiding conflict is too wasteful in comparison to the 
expected gains from expropriating the rich. For intermediate levels of inequalities, 
a social contract does not emerge unless conflicts are wasteful. The equilibrium is 
a “state of Nature” and is characterized by extensive conflict. Indeed, the cost of 
redistribution related to a democracy is too significant for the elite and getting 
involved in a conflict seems to be the best option for both the rich and the poor. 
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This is the case for defensive reasons for the first group and to expropriate from the 
rich for the second one (Cervellati et al., 2005, p.1355-1356).  
 
The basic framework 
Cervellati et al. (2005), to simplify, differentiate two political systems by their 
degree of enfranchisement. In a democracy, all agents can take part in the process 
of political decision-making while in an oligarchy, only the elite has this right. They 
further differentiate between a state of nature and a state of law4. The first one is 
characterized by the absence of a social contract. A state of law is a universally 
accepted social contract, meaning that all social interactions are governed by rules 
that all agents know and accept (Cervellati et al., 2005, p.1359).  
 
The authors base their theory on the hypothesis of an economy populated with 
overlapping generations 𝑡  of individuals. The population is divided into well-
defined groups, the elite 𝐸, which is a fraction 𝛾 < 1/2 of the population, and the 
people 𝑃, which is the remaining fraction 1 − 𝛾 of the population. Members of the 
elite are endowed with natural resources, signifying their individual income is 
higher than the one of the people, 𝑦𝑡
𝐸 > 𝑦𝑡
𝑃. 
Each group deals with an allocative problem about how to best use their income 
and decides to “arm” and engage in a conflict or “not arm”. This leads to a conflict 
of interest; the strategic form of the conflict game played between the different 
group is presented in Figure 1. Whenever one group chooses to arm, a wasteful 
conflict arises where a share (1 − 𝑔) of total available income is lost. If both groups 
enter a conflict, both groups burn a fraction 𝑔 of their own income 𝑦𝑡
𝐸 resp. 𝑦𝑡
𝑃 for 
the elite resp. the people. This is reflected in the top-left panel. If only one group 
decides to arm, a transfer of income arises from the non-armed to the armed group; 
this is depicted in the top-right and the lower left panel. When the elite arm, they 
get 𝑦𝑡
𝑔
𝛾
 and the people, as they do not arm, get nothing. In the same way, when the 
people arm, they get 𝑦𝑡
𝑔
1−𝛾
 and the elite get nothing. If both groups renounce to 
arm, conflict is prevented, no income wasted, and the two groups can implement a 
 
4 This follows the views of Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1755). 
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state of law and follow a social contract. They both get the income they had before, 
?̃?𝑡
𝐸 for the elite resp. ?̃?𝑡
𝑃 for the people. This is the situation presented in the lower 
right panel (Cervellati et al., 2005, p.1360-1361). 
 
Figure 1. The conflict game  
 
People Arm Not Arm 
Elite 
Arm 𝑔𝑦𝑡
𝐸 , 𝑔𝑦𝑡
𝑃 𝑦𝑡
𝑔
𝛾
, 0 
Not Arm 0, 𝑦𝑡
𝑔
1 − 𝛾
 ?̃?𝑡
𝐸 , ?̌?𝑡
𝑃 
Source: personal elaboration based on Cervellati et al., 2005 
 
with 𝐸 being the elite, which is a fraction 𝛾 < 1/2 of the population, 𝑃 being 
the people, which is the remaining fraction 1 − 𝛾 of the population, 𝑦𝑡 being the 
individual income at a time 𝑡 and 𝑔 being the cost of the conflict. 
 
Politico-economic Equilibrium 
A political environment will arise endogenously as equilibrium. If the society 
starts as an oligarchy, and at least one group does not have any significant reason 
to obey the social contract and therefore decides to invest in arming, a state of nature 
arises in equilibrium. This will be the case if the per capita income that the elite can 
get by arming, 
𝑦
𝛾
𝑔, is larger than their initial income 𝑦𝐸. This happens if and only 
if:  
 
𝑦
𝛾
𝑔 > 𝑦𝐸, (2.15) 
  
 with 𝑦 individual income, 𝛾 the fraction of the population constituting the elite 
(denoted by 𝐸) and 𝑔 the cost of the conflict. 
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Indeed, if this group decides to arm, all income in the economy will be 
appropriated by them. However, if the cost of a conflict is larger than the benefit 
the elite would obtain, 
 
𝑦
𝛾
𝑔 < 𝑦𝐸, (2.16) 
 
the politico-economic equilibrium is an oligarchy. The elite get a higher income 
𝑦𝐸  without arming than they could get with a conflict, 
𝑦
𝛾
𝑔. The people rationally 
assume that if they choose to arm, the elite will do the same, leading to a wasteful 
conflict. Therefore, they prefer choosing an oligarchic regime because through the 
implementation of a democracy, an equilibrium with state of nature will inevitably 
be implemented. Indeed, if the cost of the conflict is inferior to the cost of the 
redistribution, the elite will prefer the conflict. However, under an oligarchy, no 
arming is possible because people hand the power to the elite. Condition (2.16) is 
more likely to be fulfilled the richer the elite is in comparison to the people. In other 
words, the more unequal the society is, the less the elite must gain from arming so 
that the regime will remain oligarchic (Cervellati et al., 2005, pp.1367-1369). 
When a society starts as a democracy, the state of nature arises if the people can 
get a larger income by arming than by complying to the social contract. 
Analogously to (2.15), from the payoffs of the conflict game presented in Figure 1, 
it must hold that: 
 
𝑦
1 − 𝛾
𝑔 > 𝑦, (2.17) 
 
with the left member being the income agent obtain by arming and the right 
member the income agent obtain by complying to the social contract. 
A democratic equilibrium is feasible if the people have incentives not to arm. 
Symmetrically to (2.17), and comparing the payoffs from Figure 1, it is the case if:  
 
𝑦
𝑔
(1 − 𝛾)
< 𝑦. (2.18) 
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The agents get higher income (𝑦, the right member) than the one they would get 
with a conflict (𝑦
𝑔
(1−𝛾)
, the right member). This equilibrium will only arise if the 
elite also obeys the system and does not break the social contract. This will be the 
case if the cost of a conflict is higher than the cost of redistribution. This situation 
is more likely to happen if inequalities are low, otherwise the cost of the taxation is 
higher than the cost of arming to avoid taxation (Cervellati et al., 2005, p.1370). 
  
To conclude, the economy is defined by a specific level of inequality 𝜆 for each 
generation 𝑡 . Given the conditions presented above, only one equilibrium will 
emerge for any given level of inequality 𝜆𝑡 . To sum up, the equilibrium is an 
oligarchy for 𝜆𝑡
𝐸 > 𝜆𝑆𝑁, it is state of nature for 𝜆𝑡
𝐸 ∈ (𝜆𝐷 , 𝜆𝑆𝑁), and it is a democracy 
for 𝜆𝑡
𝐸 < 𝜆𝐷. This conclusion is different from the previous one, as in this model, a 
high level of inequality allows an efficient oligarchy to emerge within equilibrium. 
Indeed, in this environment, all groups choose to leave political power to the rich 
elite, because a democracy would lead to a wasteful conflict. A democratic society 
can emerge only if inequalities are relatively small. Overall, the model of this paper 
delivers new results, with the reduction in inequality being correlated with 
democratization (Cervellati et al., 2005). 
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3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL 
REGIMES AND INEQUALITIES: EMPIRICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This part reviews different papers presenting the empirical evidence of the 
relationship between political regimes and inequalities. First, I will look at studies 
about the effects of political regimes on inequalities and later on studies about the 
effects of inequalities on political regimes.  
 
3.1. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF 
POLITICAL REGIMES ON INEQUALITIES 
 
This section presents some empirical evidence of the effects of political regimes 
on inequalities. It is demonstrated that a consensus about the results is not found. 
Indeed, some authors find an egalitarian impact of democracy while others are 
doubtful about this effect. These sceptical authors argue that evidence is ambiguous 
and not robust. I will review the papers chronologically, firstly analysing older 
models, which measure a correlation, then more recent ones which are sceptical 
about this correlation. Results are expected to be different, as data should be more 
recent in the second group of models, and the method used might diverge between 
old and more recent models. Indeed, the latter takes endogeneity into account and 
control for different variables. 
 
3.1.1. SEMINAL PAPERS 
The review starts with a paper of Jackman (1974). Jackman (1974) tries to 
determine the validity of the argument that a democracy has contribute to more 
egalitarian systems. He also analyses whether the effect is linear or curvilinear. The 
dependent variable is social equality, which is defined by three variables. Social 
insurance Program Experience (SIPE) is the measure of the efforts from the state 
31 
 
to redistribute revenue in a more egalitarian way. Therefore, we expect it to 
negatively impact inequality. Each country is scored depending on the number of 
social security programs and the number of years between 1934-1960 for which 
these programs have been in effect. The Schutz Coefficient of Income Equality is 
established on changes in the amount of inequalities in income. The data used is a 
substitute measure of information collected at the individual level proposed by 
Kuznets (1957). They illustrate the extent of intersectoral income inequalities in a 
national economy; these inequalities are characterized in terms of how much they 
differ from a totally egalitarian distribution. The coefficient presented by Schutz 
(1951) is used to summarize the distribution. It calculates, on a Lorenz curve5, the 
difference between the observed slope and the line of perfect equality. Values have 
however been reversed (100 – xi) so that a higher value of the Schutz coefficient 
means a greater degree of equality; thus, making us expect a negative relationship 
between the Schutz coefficient and inequality. The Social Welfare Index is a 
function of four components: physicians per million inhabitants, infant live births 
per thousand births, caloric consumption per capita per day and protein 
consumption per capita per day. The argument for the choice of this variable is that 
those elements relate more directly on distributions. Indeed, the elite is limited on 
the extent to which they can monopolize consumption of these assets. Hence, a 
higher score on this index is assumed to be negatively correlated with inequalities 
(Jackman, 1974, pp.32-34). 
Jackman (1974) first inspects the form of the impact of the level of economic 
development on the different measures of social equality. He tests the adequacy of 
the linear and curvilinear hypotheses. The difference between the two hypotheses 
is that the curvilinear hypothesis is a type of relationship in which the variable 
increases. So does the other hypothesis, but after a certain level of economic 
development, the second variable starts decreasing as the first one continues to 
increase (Jackman, 1974, pp.34-35). 
The models are estimated separately for the three dependent variables presented 
before (Social Insurance Program Experience, Schutz Coefficient of income 
 
5  The Lorenz curve plots, in the case of income inequalities, the share of income that every 
percentage of the population has; and compares this curve with the line of perfect equality (Jackman, 
1974, p.34). 
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equality and Social Welfare Index). The linear model shows significant parameter 
estimates for the three variables, but the curvilinear model gives an even higher fit 
for all variables. Indeed, the amount of explained variance increases considerably 
with the curvilinear model (for the SIPE variables for instance, 𝑅2 is 0.355 for the 
linear model and 0.545 for the curvilinear model 6 ); the linear hypothesis is 
therefore rejected (Jackman, 1974, pp.35-37). 
Considering these results, Jackman (1974) then addresses the model of 
developmental effects in relationship with the impact of democracy on inequalities. 
Democratic performance variable emphasizes electoral participation, political 
competition, and access to information. These results support the argument that a 
political effect on inequalities is spurious. Indeed, the parameter estimate for 
democracy is smaller than its standard error of estimate, for all three variables. This 
adds assertion to the conclusion that a connection between democracy and 
inequalities only results from the impact of economic development on both 
variables (Jackman, 1974, pp.37-38).  
 To conclude, Jackman found a positive and strong effect of economic 
development on the three variables, the Social Insurance Program Experience, the 
Schutz Coefficient and the Social Welfare Index. The effect is curvilinear, which 
means that a higher level of economic development has a positive impact on social 
equality until it reaches a peak that provokes a gradual weakening of the effects. 
Jackman’s second finding is that democratic performance does not have any effect 
on any dependent variables, including income equality. Indeed, once economic 
development is taken into account, the effects of democratic performance on 
material equality are spurious. (Jackman, 1974, pp.41-43). 
 
The paper of Stack (1980), presents and tests aspects of three notable theoretical 
alternative models to the economic development model of income inequality 
presented by Kuznet (1955) 7 : first, the political model which sees political 
democracy as the most important variable in the reduction of inequalities8; second, 
 
6 R2 represents the proportion of the variance that is explained by the independent variable. 
7 Kuznet argues that the level of income inequality is largely explained by variables associated with 
the level of industrialization (Kuznet, 1963) 
8 E.g. Hewitt 1977 
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the world-economy model which thinks it is the strategic position of a nation in the 
world economy 9 . Finally, there are other socioeconomic factors that could be 
developed into new models or incorporated into existing models. In the latter, these 
variables can be used to explain secondary variation or to study income inequality 
in new models 10 . Stack (1980) tests elements of the three alternatives to the 
economic development model of income stratification. This is a tentative evaluation 
of each of these three models. Stack’s purpose is to use economic development as 
a control variable in the inequality-democracy relationship, to assess if politics has 
an effect on income inequality while being independent of the level of development 
(Stack, 1980, pp.273-277). 
Stack’s model (1980) uses the level of inequalities, measured with the Gini 
coefficient as the dependent variable. GDP per capita is used for the measure of the 
level of economic development, and the democratic performance index developed 
by Jackman11 is used for the degree of political democracy. The index includes 
political participation, competitiveness of voting, electoral irregularity, and the 
degree of freedom of the press; all the data refers to the year 1960. Each element is 
ranked from 0 to 100 and the final index is the average of the four numbers. Exports 
as a proportion of GDP are the measure used for the degree of a nation’s dependence 
on the world market, and the number of individuals in the military per 1000 working 
age population is the index of military organization for the year 1965. The degree 
of dependence on the world market can reduce efforts to limit democracy. 
Moreover, military organization tends to affect, among others, the level of 
stratification in society. Stack (1980) uses a sample of only 37 countries because 
information on the five variables were available only for those countries (Stack, 
1980, pp.279-281). 
Stack (1980) first only assesses the correlation of all coefficients with income 
inequality without controlling the other variables. He finds that all variables are 
statistically significant and have the expected sign. The one with the strongest zero 
order relationship with inequality is the index of democratic performance (r = -
0.42). Military participation is negatively and significantly related to inequality. 
 
9 E.g. Rubinson 1976 
10 E.g. Lenski, 1971 
11 Jackman, R. (1974) Politics and Social Equality 
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This is expected because, according to Andreski (1954), the nature of military 
organization seems to have an effect on many parts of a society. For instance, if the 
military ratio is high, the elite is more inclined to make compromises. It includes 
redistributing income to the non-elite since they want to insure the motive of combat 
forces and the loyalty of the troops and their family. The coefficient for the index 
of dependence on world economy is expected to be positively correlated with 
inequality. Indeed, the more a country is dependent on the world market, the less it 
has control over the production methods and the more it is vulnerable to the 
international price structure; this will hinder the efforts to reduce inequalities. 
However, when only assessing the correlation between the index of dependence on 
world economy and inequality, the coefficient is not significant (Stack, 1980, 
pp.281-282). 
Stack (1980) then conducts a regression analysis to test potential spurious 
relationships. Military participation ratio has the same negative effect as before. 
After the verification of economic development and other variables, the index of 
dependence on world economy then has a significant effect on inequality. The 
coefficient for democratic performance is statistically significant and has the same 
sign as before, which means that after controlling the level of development and 
other variables, democracy has a negative effect on inequalities. To summarize, the 
level of political democracy is the single most important variable of income 
inequalities. However, this conclusion can be questioned and should be carefully 
considered, given the small sample size and other factors (Stack, 1980, pp.283-
285). 
 
3.1.2. MORE RECENT STUDIES 
More recently, authors have questioned this correlation. More recent findings 
will try a reassessment of the relationship between a political regime and 
inequalities with better measures and a larger or more recent sample of data. 
Burkhart (1997) attempts to use what he thinks are better measures and a larger 
sample with more recent data to analyze the relationship. He tests for a parabolic 
inverted U-curve between democracy and inequalities. The theory states that, at 
first, inequalities rise with the increase of democracy, but after a certain threshold, 
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inequality decreases (Burkhart, 1997, p.151). The author probes the socioeconomic 
development as a variable likely to have an independent influence, but also for 
population structure and whether the county is communist or not. Socioeconomic 
developments are expected to have a positive effect on democracy and a positive 
inverted U-shaped relationship on inequalities. I anticipate population structure to 
negatively influence income distribution because a younger population receives less 
income, hence increasing income inequality. Lastly, as communist countries’ goal 
is to distribute the wealth, they should be more equal (Burkhart, 1997, pp.148-151). 
Burkhart (1997) uses data of income distribution from Hoover (1989) for the 
years 1983 and 1978 and from the World Bank (1993) for the years 1983 and 1988. 
The measure for democracy is the Freedom House measure: a country is considered 
a democracy if the Freedom House codes it as “Free” or “Partially Free”. Burkhart 
uses a two-stage least-squares regression procedure (2SLS) to estimate both 
equations simultaneously (democracy-income distribution and income distribution-
democracy). This procedure first implies constructing instruments for all the 
endogenous variables. In the second stage, these instruments will be used as a 
replacement for the endogenous variables; the second stage is the OLS estimation 
of the whole equations (Burkhart, 1997, pp.153-158). 
The results he gets is that from 1973 to 1988, democracy and its square (to 
control for the U-shaped relationship) have an inverted U-curve effect on income 
distribution. At a low level, democracy leans toward an increasing inequality; this 
propensity tends to weaken as the democracy score increases and after a certain 
point, income inequality rises. Socioeconomic development also has an inverted U-
curve relationship to income inequality, although the effect is rather weak. 
Communist countries seem to be more equal 12  and countries with a young 
population have more inequalities (Burkhart, 1997, pp.158-160).  
In conclusion, Burkhart’s study did find a relationship between democracy and 
inequalities, but it is, however, not linear. This suggests that democratization is 
worthy, even if at first this will increase income inequality (Burkhart, 1997, pp.160-
161). 
 
12  This conclusion should be treated with caution regarding the small number of communist 
countries in the data set (N=3). 
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Lee (2005) states that the majority of previous studies ignores the impact that 
the state might have on distributional outcomes through its interaction with 
organized societal forces (Lee, 2005, p.159). Several previous studies suppose that 
democracy directly influences inequalities, without considering the state’s role in 
resource allocation. Lee (2005) discusses the argument that inequalities might 
increase with the growth of public sector size because of the state-elites’ focus on 
economic development rather than improvement of equality within society. He also 
argues that after a certain threshold, the increase of public sector size will be linked 
to a decrease in income inequalities. This might be explained by the fact that the 
elite in power will start acknowledging the growing social welfare demands of 
interest groups. These discussions lead to a major hypothesis that he will 
empirically test: “Public sector development has a positive effect on income 
inequality in nondemocracies or limited democracies, but it has a negative effect on 
income inequality in institutionalized democracy” (Lee, 2005, p.163). Put 
differently, he argues that democracy has an influence on income inequality through 
the effects of public sector size. He tests for the interaction term (institutionalized 
democracy x public sector size) to assess if democracy has a conditional effect 
which would switch the relationship of public sector size to inequality from positive 
to negative (Lee, 2005, pp.159-172). 
Therefore, Lee (2005) presents a model of the state, democracy and income 
inequality, where he verifies the suggestion of an inverted-U-shaped curvilinear 
relationship between public sector size and inequalities. He also analyses how 
democracy gives reformist elites better chances to get their preferred redistribution. 
Linking these ideas, he found that in non-democracies, a larger government size 
will increase inequalities. On the other hand, in institutionalized democracies, 
inequalities decrease with an increase of public sector size (Lee, 2005, pp.159-161). 
For the analysis, Lee (2005) uses the Gini for a measure of inequalities as a 
dependent variable. The problem is that different measurements of the Gini exist; 
to counteract this potential bias, three dummy variables are included in the analyses: 
whether the Gini is based on income or expenditure, on households or individuals, 
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and on gross or net income. The data are for the years 1970 to 1994, they include 
341 observations of 64 countries (Lee, 2005, pp.164-165). 
He uses four groups of main independent variables. Internal development models 
include Nielsen’s (1994) different measures as the main explanatory factors: sector 
dualism, the share of the labour force in agriculture, the natural rate of population 
and the secondary school enrolment ratio. The demographic transition is expected 
to increase inequality, as a large young group tends to impoverish lower-income 
households. The expansion of education should decrease income inequality, as skill 
deepening leads to lower wage differentials. Dependence is a measure of foreign 
capital stock divided by GDP and foreign capital stock per capita. According to 
Alderson and Nielsen (1999), foreign capital is expected to increase income 
inequality. Size of the public sector describes the percentage of the government 
resources in a national economy, determined by the current tax revenue of the 
central government as a share of GDP. The size of the public sector more directly 
displays taxation and resource allocation process performed by the state. It 
estimates the share of government activities but also indicates the changes in the 
allocation process, which are conditioned on the state-elites’ policy orientation. A 
larger public sector size is expected to worsen inequalities as a result of reasons 
explained above. Institutionalization of democracy is added to show the dependant 
role of democracy in the relationship between public sector size and inequalities. 
For the measure of democracy, Lee (2005) uses the paper of Marshall and Jagger 
(2000), which includes three elements. It consists of the presence of institutions and 
procedures which could express the preferences of citizens, the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive and the 
guarantee of civil liberties. This paper points out the effects of democracy, which 
reverses the positive relationship between public sector size and inequality (Lee, 
2005, pp.165-167). 
The data set consists of a cross-national panel of 64 countries over 25 years. 
Because multiple time points are observed for each country, an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is not appropriate. Indeed, data may be correlated with each other 
because unmeasured time-invariant factors will be moved into the error term, 
creating heterogeneity bias. Lee (2005) uses a random-effects model (REM), 
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known to correct the unobserved time-invariant effects. The equation is the 
following:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + ∑(𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑗 (3.1) 
𝐸[ 𝑖𝑡] = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟[ 𝑖𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀
2 
Where i=1,2,…,N & j=1,2,…,Ti) 
 
with 𝑖 for the countries, 𝑗 the year, 𝑁 the number of countries and 𝑇 the uneven 
number of observations over time in country 𝑖. 𝛼𝑖 is the random-effect error term 
defining unobserved time-invariant factors (Lee, 2005, pp.167-169). 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis and robust even with other control 
variables. To test for a potential non-linear relationship, Lee (2005) adds a variable 
of government tax revenue and its square. The results show an inverted-U-shaped 
relationship between public sector size and inequality, where inequality increases 
at first with the expansion of public sector size and decreases after a certain 
threshold. This stresses the role of progressive tax and transfer policies in the 
reduction of inequality. However, the significance of the coefficient for the share 
of labour force in agriculture became nonsignificant and the one for the size of 
sector dualism decreased, which might suggest that the intervention from the state 
also affects inequalities indirectly through uneven redistribution to different sectors 
and not only directly through taxation and income transfers. Then, to test the 
robustness of the inverted-U-shaped relationship, Lee (2005) adds in different 
models GDP per capita and its square, foreign direct investment stock per capita 
and its square, a variable for the world system position, and regional dummies. All 
models are compatible with the claim that income inequality has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with the size of the government (Lee, 2005, pp.169-171). 
Lee (2005) further tests the relationship between the continuous measure of 
democracy and income inequality; the function of democracy is not statistically 
significant, meaning it is consistent with the assumption that democracy alone 
cannot directly affect redistribution and that inequalities might decrease only when 
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democracy is fully institutionalized13 . The next model confirms the effects of 
institutionalized democracy that converts the positive relationship between public 
sector size and inequality to a negative one. The interaction term between 
institutionalized democracy and the public sector size has a negative sign while 
public sector size is positive. This means that in a limited democracy (or an 
autocracy), an increase of 1 point in the size of government moderately increases 
the inequalities (measured as the Gini coefficient) of 0.244 points. However, in fully 
institutionalized democracy, the same increase in government size leads to a slight 
decrease of 0.08 points (0.244-0.324) in inequality. When Lee (2005) adds the 
polynomial function of GDP per capita, it confirms the results found in the previous 
model (Lee, 2005, pp.171-175). 
In conclusion, the role of the state is crucial to understand the direction of 
inequalities. Indeed, Lee (2005) found that the state-elites, as government grows, 
allocate limited resources only to certain sectors, which increase income 
inequalities between social groups. Only after a certain threshold does public sector 
size bring less inequalities. In addition to this, the author identifies the conditional 
impact of institutionalized democracy, which will shift the effects of government 
size on inequality from positive to negative. Lee’s (2005) greatest contribution is to 
show that even if previous studies could not find an agreement on the results in the 
relationship between democracy and inequalities, no conclusion is entirely wrong 
nor right. Once government size is added to the model, democracy only has an effect 
on inequalities because it converts state-elites’ policy orientation from growth to 
equity (Lee, 2005, pp.175-176). 
 
Lastly, Acemoglu et al. (2014) attempted again to assess the relationship 
between democracy and inequality while also taking redistribution into account. In 
addition to the last article by Lee (2005), their contribution is to add country fixed 
effects and time effect in a canonical panel data. Fixed effect will remove 
confounding component, which will allow to better interpret the results. For 
instance, many unobservable elements, that distinguish democracies to non-
 
13 A democracy is fully institutionalized when institutions structures are consolidated (Lee, 2005, 
p.162). 
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democracies, might also affect inequality and taxation. (Acemoglu et al., 2014, 
pp.1909-1911).  
They construct a yearly and a 5-year panel with observations for 184 countries 
between 1960 and 2010. Their measure for democracy combines information from 
Freedom House presented above and Polity IV. National income statistics are taken 
from the World Bank economic indicators. They use taxes to GDP and revenues to 
GDP ratios, secondary-schooling enrolment, agricultural shares of employment and 
GDP. For the inequality measures, they use the Standardized World Inequality 
Indicators Database. It is a panel of Gini coefficient, standardized across different 
sources and measures (Acemoglu et al., 2014, pp.1914-1916). 
The authors argue that most of the previous literature did use an OLS regression 
with 𝜌 = 0 to estimate an equation with panel data. However, in the case of 𝜌 = 1, 
this suggestion might lead to a biased estimator and this will not allow to determine 
the long-run effects of democracy. Therefore, they use a standard generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator for this study. To assess the validity of the 
results of these estimates, the authors also report OLS estimates of their equation, 
showing that the results are indeed robust to any value of 𝜌  between 0 and 1 
(Acemoglu et al., 2014, pp.1911-1913). 
They found no evidence for a statistically significant impact of democracy on 
inequality. Some estimates show a negative effect of democracy on the Gini 
coefficient, but all these results are non-significant at the standard level. They 
further test, adding control variables, but the inclusion of controls does not change 
the pattern of the previous results. However, the exclusion of income as a control 
variable leads to a significant negative effect (although small) on inequality. This 
might imply that other variables, correlated both with democracy and GDP, 
influence inequalities. Overall, they find no consistent and robust impact of 
democracy on inequalities (Acemoglu et al., 2014, pp.1928-1935). 
 
To summarize, this section reviewed some of the empirical literature on whether 
and how democracy reduces economic inequality. At first glance, it seemed that 
democracy does have an effect on inequalities. Indeed, a large series of articles, 
some of which were presented in this thesis, do find a negative relationship between 
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political regimes and inequality. Other studies include those of Cutright (1967), 
Hewitt (1977) and Muller (1988). However, it seems like when more, or different 
data is included in a model, the relationship becomes spurious. Indeed, we got a 
first suggestion that with more recent studies, which have more recent data and 
improved empirical techniques, the results on the relationship between democracy 
and inequalities are not the same. Among sceptical authors which are not presented 
here, we can cite those who find a curvilinear relationship between democracy and 
inequality, like Simpson (1990) and Gradstein and Justman (1999). Finally, other 
studies like the one of Weede (1989), Rodrik (1999) or Albertus and Menaldo 
(2013) find no significant relationship between democracy and inequality. 
 
3.2. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF 
INEQUALITIES ON POLITICAL REGIMES  
 
Empirical evidence of the causal influence running in the other direction, namely 
inequalities influencing political regime, are presented in this section. The results 
are again heterogeneous. Some studies find no significant effect of inequalities on 
democracies, while others find a positive correlation between change in income and 
democracy. Like in the previous section, we review studies in a chronological order, 
as data and method have evolved.  
 
3.2.1. SEMINAL PAPERS 
A pioneer paper on the question about the relationship between inequalities and 
democracy is the one of Rubinson and Quinlan (1977). They address and compare 
the results of Jackman (1974), presented in the previous section, which find no 
relationship between democracy and inequalities. Coupled with the results of 
Cutright (1967) a different conclusion is reached by finding a negative effect of 
democracy on inequalities. Jackman’s index of democracy was already presented 
before. In comparison, Cutright constructs his index for the year 1945-1954 in the 
following way: for each year a parliament existed in which the lower chamber 
involved members of two or more political parties; and the minority parties had at 
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least 30 percent of the seats, a nation is given two points. The nation got zero point 
if it had no parliament for the year. An additional point is given if the chief 
executive was elected with a direct vote (Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977, pp.611-613). 
In their article, Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) try to understand these 
contradictory findings. By doing so, they focus, among others, on the direction of 
the causal effect. In other words, they are looking at the effect that inequalities 
might have on democracy. Indeed, observations of inter-country differences in 
income inequality are mostly related to the relative strength of the middle-class. 
This suggests that income distribution is mainly a function of the relative power of 
economic groups in a country; an economically powerful and large middle-class 
being correlated to the greatest income equality. Therefore, countries are compared 
by the degree to which the middle-class dominates the society, suggesting 
inequalities have an impact on democratization because they seem to be an indicator 
of class structure (Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977, pp.613-615).  
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) test this hypothesis with the following equation:  
 
𝑋1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑌1 + 𝑏2𝑋2 + 𝑒, (3.9) 
 
with 𝑋1 Jackman or Cutright democracy index, 𝑌1 personal income inequality 
(Gini or 3rd quintile) and 𝑋2 ln kilowatt-hours of energy consumption per capita 
(KWH). Inequalities are measured by the Gini index, but also with the middle 40-
60 percent (the 3rd quintile) because it is an indicator of the economic power of the 
middle-class. Indeed, it shows the share of income which accumulates to the middle 
of the income distribution. Inequality measured with the Gini index is expected to 
be negatively related to the index of democratization; while the 3rd quintile should 
be positively related to democratization14. Indeed, the latter represents the share of 
income going to the middle-class, so that a large indicator means less inequality 
while a high level of the Gini index means a high level of inequality (Rubinson and 
Quinlan, 1977, pp.616-617). 
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) find that an increase of 1 point of the Gini index 
largely decreases the index of democratization of Jackman of 56.41 points and the 
 
14 Paukert, 1973. 
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index of Cutright of 17.11 points. They also find that the 3rd quintile has a positive, 
which is a rather small but significant effect on both indexes of democratization, of 
2.08 point for Jackman and 0.529 points for Cutright. These conclusions are 
consistent with our expectations (Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977, p.617). 
Nevertheless, the equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), making 
it difficult to ascertain the validity of each specification. Hence, the authors then 
proceed the equation with the instrumental variables method (IV). Two variables 
are added to the model: Horizontal Power Distribution (POWCON) and 
government revenue as a share of gross domestic product (GOVREV). This implies 
that errors are uncorrelated with the independent variables in the equations. The 
first instrumental variable measures to which extent the different branches of 
government can exercise their functions or if they are dominated by another branch. 
It is scored from 0 to 2, with 0 being a more equal power distribution and 2 a more 
concentrated power distribution. Government revenue as a share of gross domestic 
product is added because it is supposed to be a measure of state strength, which is 
one of the most important causes of inter-country variables in inequality (Rubinson 
and Quinlan, 1977, p.618). 
The results are presented in Table 1 for Jackman’s index. Column 1 and 3 shows 
the OLS estimates, and column 3 and 4 presents the IV estimates for comparison. 
The effects of inequalities on democratization are shown under column 3 and 4. 
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Table 1. Analysis Using Jackman’s Index: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Instrumental Variables (IV) Regression Estimates 
 
Source: Personal elaboration based on Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977. 
 
Column 4 of Table 1 demonstrates that an increase of the Gini index of 1 point 
largely decrease the Jackman’s index of 143.35 points (significant with a t-statistic 
of 2.34). In comparison, the OLS model finds a moderate effect of -60.741 (with a 
significant t-statistic of 2.90). This shows that the IV estimation increases the size 
of the negative impact of the Gini on Jackman’s index. The same pattern arises 
using 3rd quintile, as it has a significant effect (t-statistic of 2.63) of 4.03 on 
Jackman, meaning an increase of the 3rd quintile index of 1 point slightly increases 
Jackman’s index of democracy of 4.03 points. The size of the coefficient is 75 
percent greater than the OLS estimate (Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977, pp.618-621). 
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) find the same pattern of results with Cutright’s 
index. An increase of 1 point of the Gini index moderately decreases Cutright’s 
index of 40.74 points (significant with a t-statistic of 2.14). The size of the impact 
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of the Gini index again increases significantly with the IV equation. The results 
with 3rd quintile are about the same: it has a small effect of 1.20 on Cutright’s index 
(significant with a t-statistic of 2.27). The size of the effect of inequality on Cutright 
also increases with IV estimation (Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977, pp.621-623). 
In summary, the use of instrumental variables allows for an increase in size, 
always statistically significant. These results are the same for both index of 
democratization and for the two different measures of inequality, which supports 
the hypothesis that inequalities impact democratization (Rubinson and Quinlan, 
1977, p.623). 
 
Bollen and Jackman’s study (1985) focuses on some problems they found in the 
previous literature on the subject. They first look at the issue that only Rubinson 
and Quinlan (1977) estimate a simultaneous-equations model, allowing for 
inequalities to appear, but also influencing democracy. The remaining papers 
restrict their attention on the effects of democracy on inequality. Moreover, Bollen 
and Jackman take into account an inverted U-shaped curve between economic 
development and inequality. If the development-inequality relationship is 
spuriously specified, it distorts the estimates for this relationship but also the other 
estimates, like those for the development-inequality effects. To solve this issue, 
Bollen and Jackman (1985) propose an analysis that tests for simultaneity and the 
U-shaped development-inequality relation (Bollen and Jackman, 1985, pp.441-
442). 
The second problem they address is the measurement problem. A comparability 
problem emerges when the data does not always refer to individuals as the income-
receiving unit; most studies took either the distribution of income across industrial 
sectors or referring to household, or to individuals. For the democracy measure, it 
suffers from definitional and measurement problems. Some previous studies did not 
distinguish between political democracy and social democracy, between political 
stability and political democracy or between democracy and electoral participation. 
Although these measures might be correlated, they are distinct and should be 
separately controlled. Bollen and Jackman (1985) therefore use measure of 
inequality reflecting household/individual income and democracy data that is not 
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influenced by stability and turnout. The last issue is that these studies use different 
samples, challenging the comparison of the results. Bollen and Jackman (1985) use 
a reasonably large sample with less developed countries (Bollen and Jackman, 
1985, pp.441-442). 
To estimate the relation between democracy and inequality, Bollen and Jackman 
(1985) propose a two-stage least-square (2SLS) and a new weighted 2SLS 
procedure. They define a simultaneous-equations model with a sufficient number 
of exogenous variables to meet the conditions for identification. They further 
control for factors that might alter the democracy-inequality relationship (Bollen 
and Jackman, 1985, p.442). 
In the income inequality equation, the first variable is political democracy. 
Inequalities are specified as a curvilinear function of the level of economic 
development, represented as a quadratic curve. A second variable is taken from the 
world-system view. This perspective argues that states are included in a wider 
system: the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery. These three blocks have 
asymmetrical relationships between each other, and the core benefits at the expense 
of the two other blocks. Intranational stratification then tends to increase 
distributional inequalities in noncore countries. Therefore, I expect this variable to 
be positively related to inequalities. Bollen and Jackman (1985) use a qualitative 
classification to discern the core, the periphery and semi-periphery. They do so 
because according to the world-system theory, inequality should be more 
pronounced outside the core. Moreover, they control for characteristics of the 
population. For instance, high rates of population growth increase income 
inequality as it expands the proportion of populations in low-income groups. Lastly, 
they include a qualitative variable to counteract measurement error in the inequality 
data. Countries are classified according to the type of inequality data recorded 
(Bollen and Jackman, 1985, pp.442-444). 
For the Political-Democracy equation, they include inequality, socioeconomic 
development, dependency and position in the world system, the share of the 
population protestant and a measure of colonial experience (Bollen and Jackman, 
1985, pp.444-445). 
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The data is collected for a sample of 60 countries. The income inequality data 
(INEQ) comes from World Bank sources, with a mean year being 1968. It indicates 
the percentage of income earned by the wealthiest 20 percent of the population, the 
40 following percent and the 40 poorest percent. The type of inequality data 
(INDIVID) is of the form of the household (single person or multi-person) as the 
income unit for 42 of 60 countries. For the remaining 18 countries, the inequality 
data is based on the distribution of income across individuals. The index of political 
democracy (POLDEM) of Bollen (1980), already presented before, is the measure 
used for the year 1965. Gross National Product per capita is used as the measure of 
development (GNP/p). To order the share of the population that is young, they 
employ the proportion of the population aged between 0 and 14 years old (AGE0-
14). The world-system position is reviewed with the classification by Snyder and 
Kick (1979), who analyze four indicators of international networks and then puts 
the countries into the core, semi-periphery (SEMPER) and periphery (PER). Lastly, 
they take the share of the population Protestant in the year 1965 (PROT), and they 
use a dummy variable coded 1 if the country was a former British colony and 0 
otherwise (BRITCOLN) (Bollen and Jackman, 1975, pp.445-446). 
The two equations are the following:  
 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀 + 𝑏2 ln (
𝐺𝑁𝑃
𝑝
) + 𝑏3 (ln(
𝐺𝑁𝑃
𝑝
))2 + 𝑏4 𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅 +
𝑏5𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝑏6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷 + 𝑏7𝐴𝐺𝐸0 − 14 + 𝑒1 (3.10)
 
 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑀 = 𝑏8 + 𝑏9𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 + 𝑏10 ln (
𝐺𝑁𝑃
𝑝
) + 𝑏11𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝑏12 𝑃𝐸𝑅 +
𝑏13 ln(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇) + 𝑏14𝐵𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑁 + 𝑒2 (3.11)
 
 
The analysis proceeds in four stages: first, they control for potential outliers that 
could impact their estimates. No country has been found to change the results when 
taken out of the sample. The second step is to estimate the model with two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS). The equation for income inequality contains 2SLS and 
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W2SLS estimates to correct for heteroscedasticity15. The effects of democracy on 
inequalities is found to be nonsignificant. Plus, the democracy coefficient has the 
wrong sign, which would mean that a more democratic society leads to more 
inequalities. Table 2 presents the estimates for the political democracy equation. 
This equation only contains 2SLS estimates.  
 
Table 2. Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates for the Political-Democracy Equation (N=60) 
 
Source: personal elaboration based on Bollen and Jackman, 1985. 
 
It can be emphasized that no significant effect of inequalities on political 
democracy is found. Moreover, the inequality coefficient is also not composed by 
the sign we would have expected. For the remaining variables, economic 
development, the dummy for British-colony and the indicator for Protestantism all 
have a positive effect on democracy (Bollen and Jackman, 1985, pp.446-448). 
After that, they control if collinearity is the problem leading to nonsignificant 
effect of inequality and democracy on each other’s. Both democracy and inequality 
are endogenous variables and formed as linear association of all the exogenous 
variables, so that the collinearity they found is expected and do not explain the no 
significance of both variables (Bollen and Jackman, 1985, pp.448-449). 
To conclude, Bollen and Jackman did not find any evidence of a relationship 
between democracy and inequality, in either way. The inequality equation indicated 
 
15 To assess whether to correct for heteroscedasticity or not, Bollen and Jackman used a test proposed 
by Harvey and Phillips (1981) based on the residuals of the equation estimated with 2SLS. 
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the importance to contrast different kinds of inequality data. The results from the 
democracy equation showed the importance of socioeconomic development, along 
with other cultural and political variables for democratic political institutions 
(Bollen and Jackman, 1985, pp.450-452). 
 
3.2.2. MORE RECENT STUDIES 
In a more recent paper, Muller (1995) tries to explain the contradiction between 
the theory that argues that the level of economic development is the most important 
explanatory component of the level of democracy and the empirical evidence which 
does not support this theory16. To do so, he focuses on the relationship between 
income inequality and the level of democracy, while also controlling for economic 
development. He uses the hypothesis that income inequality affects the process of 
democratization; if its impact is negative, it can counteract the positive effect of 
economic development. Besides, as economic development first negatively 
influences income inequality, it is a possible explanation on why moderately 
developed countries experiment a decline in their level of democracy (Muller, 1995, 
pp.966-967). 
Muller (1995) analyses in this paper the relationship between economic 
development, income inequality and the level of democracy. He uses different 
variables as before: the gross national product (GDP) as a measure of economic 
development, the Gini coefficient and the share of personal income received by the 
richest quintile as a measure of income inequality and the index of liberal 
democracy created by Bollen (1980)17. The sample contains 58 countries and is used 
to assess the effects of economic development and income inequality in 1970 on 
change in level of democracy during the period 1965-1980 (Muller, 1995, pp.969-
970). 
The authors found that all 16 high-income countries also have high democratic 
scores. Moreover, more than half of them have a relatively low level of income 
inequality (a Gini smaller or equal 0.35). Only one country has very high-income 
 
16 For instance, in Latin America, the level of democracy declines, even in the most economically 
advanced countries (Muller, 1995, p.967). 
17 The measure rank from authoritarian society (0) to democratic society (100). 
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inequalities (0.47), all others have intermediate level of inequalities. In the upper-
middle-income group, all countries with low level of income inequalities were able 
to maintain stable democracy, while half of those with middle to high-income 
inequality saw their levels of democracy declining. Most middle-income countries 
score with high-income inequality and all of them also experiment decline in their 
level of democracy. The group of low-income countries includes countries with a 
stable democracy, with decline in level of democracy and even with increase of 
level of democracy. Most countries in this group have low to middle levels of 
inequality (Muller, 1995, pp.970-971). 
If the hypothesis that the level of economic development is the determinant 
variable of democracy, then middle- and upper-middle income countries should 
have an increase in their democracy score. Nevertheless, 45 percent of low-income 
countries, 67 percent of the middle-income countries, 40 percent of the upper-
middle income countries and 0 percent of high-income countries recorded a decline 
in the level of democracy. The analysis shows an inverted-U relationship between 
the two variables: income inequality seems to have a negative effect on 
democratization, as countries with middle levels of economic development and high 
levels of income inequality decline in democratization. Indeed, 72 percent of 
middle-income countries are highly inegalitarian, while the percentage is only 27 
percent for low-income countries, 30 percent for upper-middle income countries 
and 6 percent of high-income countries (Muller, 1995, pp.971-973). 
The contribution of Muller’s (1995) paper also comes from the fact that he 
further asks whether income inequality and economic development directly affect 
changes in the level of democracy. The analysis supports the U-curve relationship 
theory between economic development and democratization. Muller (1995) further 
includes income inequality in the model to assess if this variable is the direct cause 
of decline in the level of democracy for countries with middle level of economic 
development. The results show that once inequality is taken into account, it has a 
significant negative effect on democratization, and the U-curve relationship 
between economic development and democratization becomes spurious. Hence, 
this U-curve relationship seems to indicate that countries with middle levels of 
economic development are likely to have higher level of income inequalities. In 
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summary, income inequality seems to hinder democratization, and this effect 
explains why countries with middle levels of economic development experience a 
decrease of democracy. Unlike countries with very low or very high level of 
development, hey are more likely to see their level of democracy decline as they 
have higher levels of income inequality, which makes it complicated to maintain a 
high level of democracy. On the other hand, countries with a low level of 
development, since they do not have as much inequalities as countries with middle 
levels of economic development, are more likely to experience a relatively high 
level of democracy (Muller, 1995, pp.968-975). 
To conclude, income inequality is an inverted-U function of the level of 
economic development. Therefore, countries with intermediate levels of economic 
development are the most inegalitarian ones. As presented above, those are the 
more likely to suffer an important decrease in their level of democracy. Moreover, 
income inequality directly and negatively affects the level of democracy (Muller, 
1995, pp.979-981). 
 
Further, some authors shifted their studies from the relationship between wealth 
and democracy to the relationship between wealth distribution and inequality. Boix 
(2003), for instance, argues that inequality undermines both democratization and 
consolidation of democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also claim that 
inequality hinders consolidation, but it relates to democratization through an 
inverted U-shaped curve. These ideas are developed theoretically but they lack 
empirical support. Thus, Houle (2009) conducts an empirical test of the relationship 
between inequality and democracy. It differs from other studies by the method – 
dynamic probit. This method allows the distinction between the effects of inequality 
on democracy but also its impact on consolidation of democracy. Houle 
demonstrates that the relationship between inequality and democracy complements 
the relationship between wealth and democracy (Houle, 2009, pp.589-590). 
Houle (2009) uses the capital shares database of Ortega and Rodriguez (2006) 
for the measure of inequality. It includes 3500 observations for 116 countries from 
the years 1960 to 2000. Houle (2009) regrets the fact that previous literature cannot 
be compared, as the data comes from different sources. This might considerably 
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impact the inequality measure. Houle (2009) discusses the use of the dataset of 
Deininger and Squire, broadly used in the studies of income inequality. He says that 
the sample of observations is biased toward wealthy, democratic countries which 
have the ability and the will to collect these data. Moreover, Houle (2009) looks at 
Burkhart’s findings (1977), which are reviewed above. Burkhart (1977) finds an 
inverted U-shaped relationship, but his analysis only includes data of 56 countries, 
which might not be representative of the population. For instance, few observations 
are taken from sub-Saharan Africa and particularly the Middle East. Houle (2009) 
includes more countries from these regions, which tend to have a moderate level of 
inequality and authoritarian regimes (Houle, 2009, pp. 591-601). 
Houle takes regimes types data from the Przeworski et al. (2000) database, for 
most countries from 1950 to 2002. A country can either be a democracy or an 
autocracy, and it has to fill in four conditions: the chief executive and the legislature 
have to be elected by the people, except that the chief executive can be elected 
directly or indirectly, and the legislature has to be elected directly. More than one 
party must exist, and at least one alternation in power due to elections must have 
taken place (Houle, 2009, p.601). 
The measure for the independent variable, inequality, is capital share of the value 
added in the industrial sector, from Ortega and Rodriguez (2006). The database 
contains 3500 observations for 116 countries, covering the year 1960 to 2000. This 
measure is chosen by Houle (2009) because low capital shares are correlated with 
low inequality, as an important part of the value added in production is accumulated 
by the labor class. It has the advantage that it measures the relative income of the 
elite, thus focusing on intergroup inequality and not overall inequality. The second 
advantage is that countries can be compared between each other, as the same 
definitions and methods of capital shares are used for all countries (Houle, 2009, 
pp.602-603). 
Houle (2009) then verifies the economic performance, measured by the GPD per 
capita, the growth of the GDP per capita and the structure of the economy, 
particularly whether the country possesses natural resources. The control for 
economic performance was already explained above; whether a country has natural 
resources is measured by a dummy variable for large oil exporters. If a society relies 
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massively on natural resources, the society is less likely to be democratic as the 
elites are more vulnerable to taxation. The social and cultural context might also 
influence democracy; hence the author adds variables measuring the share of the 
population that are Muslim, Catholic and Protestant. Religion might affect the 
tolerance of the population toward inequality. Moreover, measures of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization are included, indicating the likelihood that two randomly 
selected person belong to different ethnic or religious groups. Indeed, a divided 
society might be less likely to start and preserve democratic institutions. As for the 
political variables, a dummy variable for former British colonies and a dummy 
variable for countries that did not exist in 1975. The former is added because British 
colonies are said to have inherited institutions more inclined to democracy (La Porta 
et al., 1998) and the latter because these countries might not have the prerequisites 
for democracy. The number of transitions from democracy to dictatorship is 
controlled for, since a country which experienced many coups is more likely to be 
suffering from more coups in future. Lastly, a dummy variable for a presidential 
democracy is included, as they are more fragile than other types of democracies; 
and the share of democracies in the world is also controlled for. All variables are 
taken from the dataset of Przeworski et al. (2000) (Houle, 2009, pp.603-605). 
Houle uses a dynamic probit model, which estimates the probability of countries 
with a definite regime to change for another regime in the next period. This allows 
to contrast the effects of different independent variables on democratization. The 
results of the analysis are the following: in both linear and nonlinear models, lower 
capital shares are correlated with smaller probability of a transition to democracy, 
but the relation is not statistically significant. The nonlinear relationship is then 
controlled, but capital share and squared capital share have the wrong sign although 
they are not significant, meaning the relationship between inequality and 
democracy is not an inverted U-shaped. Controlling for region and decade variables 
does not change the results (Houle, 2009, pp.606-609). 
The analysis of the effects of capital shares on the stability of democracy 
shows that democracies with large capital shares are more likely to break down 
when the estimate is significant, presuming that inequality harms consolidation. 
Controlling for region and decade dummy variables decreased lightly the estimates 
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but they are still significant and important. The results of the control variables are 
robust across model specifications: Houle (2009) found wealth to not affect the 
likelihood of being a democracy but to support consolidation; exporting oil do not 
affect democratization nor consolidation. Ethnic, religious fractionalization and 
religion do not have any effect on democracy. For political factors, having a past of 
British colonization does not impact the transition to democracy but does affect 
consolidation; whether a country existed in 1945 or not does not impact 
democratization. The number of past regime transitions makes it more likely for a 
country to become a democracy but not to remain one. Lastly, when there are many 
democracies, a country is more prone to become and stay a democracy (Houle, 
2009, pp.606-615). 
To conclude, Houle (2009) found that inequalities have no net effect on 
democratization; however, they do harm consolidation of democracy. Past studies 
might have not found these results because of the database or the method used.  
 
To resume this section, the effects of inequalities on democracy is not very clear 
and further research is needed to analyse if the relationship between inequality and 
democracy does exist. There is a vast literature on the subject and the results are 
heterogeneous. Some authors argue that the level of inequality does influence the 
level of democracy or the process of democratization; however, a positive or 
negative impact of inequalities on political democracy might be found because of 
errors in the equation, like measurement errors. We saw that economic 
development, when considered, might play a crucial role in the connection between 
inequality and democracy. Besides, making the difference between different kinds 
of inequality data can also change the results of the relationship.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I looked at the relationship between political regimes and 
inequality in a unified theoretical and empirical framework. It is crucial to 
understand if democracy is efficient in reducing inequality to find out whether it is 
worth it to initiate the democratization process, and if inequality plays a role in the 
process of democratization. 
Theoretically, I reviewed the expected redistributive effects of democracy thanks 
to the extension of political power, shifting the median voter to the poorer segments 
of society and therefore increasing demand for redistribution. However, I presented 
how captured democracy by an elite might not lead to a reduction in inequality. I 
suggested models of inefficient states in which the rich elite influences the public 
bureaucracy or manipulates political outcome. This leads to inefficient state 
structure and institutions, consequently limiting redistribution and cancelling the 
political power poorer agents gained through democratization. I also demonstrated 
how the middle-class might also capture democracy to its advantage, for instance 
through their benefits from the social security system. On the other hand, 
authoritarian regimes are better able to protect the interests of the poor and working 
class, which therefore suggests that more redistribution occurs in an autocratic 
society than in a democracy. Nevertheless, the elite can pursue policies that benefit 
them because since there is a lack of a political mechanism holding the elite 
responsible for the majority. Hence, equality will not be improved in an autocracy, 
unless democracy poses a revolutionary threat; in this case, redistribution does take 
place in an autocracy.  
For the effects of inequality on political regimes, I cited models emphasizing the 
role of social unrest as a factor in the transition to democracy. Indeed, when the 
poor are excluded from political power, they pose a revolutionary threat likely to 
force the elite to democratize when inequality is high. In addition, the relationship 
between income per capita and inequality is forced by political changes, caused by 
the increase of social tensions that come from rising inequality. Besides, good 
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economic characteristics might lead to the endogenous evolution emergence of a 
democracy: economic inequality and economic development can be both a cause 
and a consequence of political changes. 
Empirically, I presented evidence of the relationship between political regimes 
and inequality and did not reach any consensus about the results: some authors find 
an egalitarian impact of democracy while others are doubtful about this effect. I 
presented seminal papers which did not find any effect of democracy on inequality 
once economic development is taken into account; even when different elements of 
previous models are controlled for. More recent findings found a nonlinear 
relationship between democracy and inequalities with a larger sample and more 
recent data. I presented a model which considers the impact that the state might 
have on distributional outcomes through its interaction with organized societal 
forces, finding that inequalities will only decrease with an increase of public sector 
size in institutionalized democracies. Models with country fixed effects and time 
effects did not find any evidence of a statistically significant impact of democracy 
on inequality.  
I found again heterogenous for the empirical studies about the effects of 
inequalities on political regimes. The seminal papers identified, with the use of 
instrumental variable, that inequality does negatively impact democratization. More 
recent studies controlled for the effects of economic development in the relationship 
between democracy and inequality and found an inverted-U function of the level of 
economic development along with a negative direct effect of inequality on 
democracy. Besides, another study found that inequality has no effect on 
democratization but on consolidation of democracy. 
These patterns suggest that the effects of democracy on redistribution and 
inequality may be more nuanced than often presumed and highly heterogeneous. 
Unfortunately, the conclusion is not evident, and we cannot expressly say whether 
there is a relationship between democracy and inequality. Theoretically, democracy 
should negatively affect inequality, unless it is captured by a part of the society; and 
it is not clear the way inequality impacts democracy. Empirically, the results are 
different depending on the model and the data used. To conclude, the relationship 
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between democratic institutions and inequality is worth further empirical 
investigation, for instance with bigger samples and more recent data. 
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